译文（字数 3191）：

增量资本结构决策在管理防御的实证分析

作者： 安倍德容

摘要

我们研究了荷兰公司增量资本结构决策。从1977到1996的这些公司已经把公共和私人股权和债务137公共问题110问题直。荷兰公司经理盘踞。因为这个原因之间存在差异的管理决策和股东的反应。确认它们[美国经济评论（1996）1197–1215 ]我们发现荷兰经理避免债务的约束作用使他们过度投资。然而，市场的反应表明，这种过度投资行为是被认可的。我们没有找到一个梅尔斯和Majluf [金融经济学杂志的逆向选择模型的确认（1984）187–221 ]。这可能是由于管理者和权利问题之防御。

关键词：资本结构；管理防御；荷兰；人权问题；增发股票；公告效应

外文原文（字符数 6213）：

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INCREMENTAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS

UNDER MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT

Abe de Jong† and Chris Veld‡,*Abstract

Abstract

We study incremental capital structure decisions of Dutch companies. From 1977 to 1996 these companies have made 110 issues of public and private seasoned equity and 137 public issues of straight debt. Managers of Dutch companies are entrenched. For this reason a discrepancy exists between managerial decisions and shareholder reactions. Confirming Zwiebel [American Economic Review (1996) 1197–1215] we find that Dutch managers avoid the disciplining role of debt allowing them to overinvest. However, the market reactions show that this overinvestment behavior is recognized. We do not find a confirmation of the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf [Journal of Financial Economics (1984) 187–221]. This is probably due to the entrenchment of managers and the prevalence of rights issues.

Keywords：Capital structure; Managerial entrenchment; The Netherlands; Rights issues; Seasoned equity offerings; 

Announcement effects