摘 要:蔬菜市场存在着消费者利益与种植户利益的矛盾，一方面消费者希望降低蔬菜价格，而过低的蔬菜价格则会损害种植户的利益。这种矛盾的根源在于蔬菜供应链模式的不合理。本文采用易逝品供应链的研究方法，研究了蔬菜公司主导的供应链定价机制及收益问题。在外部需求部分依赖于价格，部分随机且价格内生的情况下，分别讨论了分散决策和集中决策中，蔬菜供应链在零售价格、订货量和系统收益三个方面的差异，并通过数值仿真对两种模式进行了比较。此外，本文从风险分担的角度，给出了通过收益共享契约实现蔬菜供应链协调的方法，通过设定相应的契约参数，使供应链达到集中决策时的状态，并给出了收益共享契约稳定的前提条件。研究表明：各自追求收益最大化的分散决策供应链是造成目前消费者利益与种植户利益矛盾的重要原因。收益共享契约能够缓解供应链存在的“双边际效应”，降低蔬菜的零售价格，提高蔬菜供应链系统的收益。种植户提供确定的批发价格，蔬菜公司提出合理的收益分配比例，可以使得收益共享契约在达到协调的同时，具有稳定性。

关键词：蔬菜供应链；定价机制；系统收益；收益共享契约；供应链协调

ABSTRACT:Nowadays, the interest of customers conflicts with the interest of farmers in the vegetable market. As the customers, they want to enjoy a lower retail price. However ,the farmers desire to get a higher wholesales price in order to guarantee their revenue. Such dilemma is caused by the inapporpriate supply chain. This passage adopts the study of perishable products to analyse the price strategy and the revenue problems in the vegetable supply chain, which is dominated by the vegetable company. With the price endogenous and the demand partly dependent with price, partly uncertained, we discuss the difference in retail price, purchasing quantity and system revenue between decentralized and centralized supply chain. Furthermore, by using the revenue-sharing contract ,we successfully coordinate the supply chain. The study shows that the contradiction between farmers’ interest and customers’ interest is caused by the decentralized supply chain. However, with the revenue-sharing contract, the “Double Marginalization” can be released, the price can be lower and the revenue of system can be higher. In order to maintain the stability of the contract, farmers should present a certain wholesales price as well as the company should give an apporpriate allocation proportion. 

Keywords: vegetable supply chain; price strategy; system revenue; revenue-sharing contract; supply chain coordination